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Throwing Dirt on Doctor Frankenstein’s Grave:
Access to Experimental Treatments at the End of Life
Michael J. Malinowski*

Abstract
All U.S. federal research funding triggers regulations to protect human subjects known as
the Common Rule, a collaborative government effort that spans seventeen federal agencies. The
Department of Health and Human Services has been in the process of re-evaluating the Common
Rule comprehensively after decades of application and in response to the jolting advancement of
biopharmaceutical science. The Common Rule designates specific groups as “vulnerable
populations”—pregnant women, fetuses, children, prisoners, and those with serious mental
comprehension challenges—and imposes heightened protections of them. This article addresses
a question at the cornerstone of regulations to protect human subjects as biopharmaceutical
research and development increasingly commingles clinical research and clinical care—as
patients and physicians routinely reach into the drug development pipeline for treatment options.
Given the vulnerabilities of those who confront end-of-life decision making, should the
regulatory standard be raised to more effectively protect the terminally ill from additional
suffering and the loss of quality time with family and friends, and to increase recognition of the
opportunity to die with priority placed on comfort care and dignity? Alternatively, where death
is the only existing option under standard of care, should the regulations be relaxed to promote
access to experimental treatment alternatives? What importance should be placed on the overall
advancement of biopharmaceutical research and development (R&D) in addressing these human
health issues? This article proposes modifying the Common Rule to enhance human subject
protection of the terminally ill, which the U.S. standard of care generally recognizes as a
diagnosis of life expectancy of six months or less.
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"It hath been often said that it is not death, but dying, which is terrible."
Henry Fielding 1

I.

Introduction

Joe, 2 the self-employed owner of a small construction and demolition company and the
father of two young children, one seven and the other nine, was just thirty-seven when he was
diagnosed with extremely advanced hairy cell leukemia in 1973—a death sentence at the time. 3
When finally diagnosed definitively after repeated and often lengthy hospitalizations, gangrene
had inflated his spleen, normally about the size of a tennis ball, to the equivalent of a football.
1

HENRY FILEDING, AMELIA 125 (2012).
Joe was my father; his story as relayed is factual. I began writing this article several times in the past, but it has
taken more than twenty years of work in health law for me to bring it to fruition.
3
See Rose Kivi, Hairy Cell Leukemia, (Aug. 7, 2012), available at http://ask.healthline.com/health/hairy-cellleukemia (last visited Mar. 20, 2013). Hairy cell leukemia (HCL) is a rare type of typically slow-growth blood and
bone marrow cancer that produces a surplus of abnormal B-lymphocyte cells, a type of white blood cell that produce
antibodies that fight infections. Id. These abnormal cells impede healthy ones, resulting in a low white blood cell
count and a weakened immunity system. The production of these abnormal cells also can decrease red blood cells
and platelets, and impede T-lymphosites (“T-cells”) that help healthy B-lymphocytes fight infection. Id. According
to the National Institutes of Health (NIH), as of 12012, treatments now allow patients with the disease to routinely
live 10 years or longer after diagnosis. Id. See also Harvey M. Golomb, Hairy Cell Leukemia: Treatment
Successes in the Past 25 Years, 26 J.CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 2607-2609 (2008), available at
http://jco.ascopubs.org/content/26/16/2607.short (last visited Feb. 20, 2013). This improvement in treatment success
is largely attributable to the outcome of the study Joe participated in, sponsored by Biogen Inc.., which resulted in
the development of Interferon Alpha. See Biogen Idec. Official Site, available at http://www.biogenidec.com/ (last
visited Mar. 30, 2013). The same pioneering science led to the development of AVONEX, a groundbreaking
treatment for multiple sclerosis introduced to the market in 1996. See id. at http://www.biogenidecinternational.com/our_history.aspx?ID=11766 (last visited Jan. 14, 2013). Incidentally, John Moore, the plaintiff in
the landmark intellectual property and bioethics case Moore v. Regents of the University of California, was
diagnosed with hairy cell leukemia three years after Joe and contributed to research as well, though without his
consent. See generally 51 Cal. 3d 120, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146; 793 P.2d 479 (1990).
2

2

Although uninsured, Joe had the good fortune of living within thirty-five miles of the Boston
medical mecca, and a Harvard-affiliated doctor took over his care and put him on an
experimental protocol. Overall, the treatment and related care gave Joe fourteen years of
productive life—albeit with constant monitoring of his white blood cell counts (T-cells in
particular), ingestion of potent medications, painful bone marrow tests, and frequent
hospitalizations to fight infections and to raise his white blood cell levels.
However, in 1987, fourteen years after his spleen was removed, Joe’s health began to
deteriorate rapidly. A growth behind his left ear was diagnosed as malignant melanoma.
Although the hairy cell leukemia generally remained in remission, surgery to remove the
melanoma was followed by a diagnosis of lymphoma—cancer that begins in the cells of the
immune system. 4 Within months, Joe noticed a lump behind the same ear, which turned out to
be an aggressive, external squamous cell tumor. 5 The tumor grew rapidly and engulfed his face
and neck, devouring his flesh and literally opening his throat, which required painful cleaning
and re-bandaging several times daily to combat infection.
Still, Joe was just fifty-three years old, with a strong heart and lungs and a muscular
physique that reflected working heavy construction from the age of fourteen. Although he never
completed the eighth grade (his reading comprehension was more realistically on a sixth-grade
level), one of his sons had just entered Yale Law School, and he desperately wanted to see his
youngest child, his fifteen-year-old son Scott, graduate from high school. So Joe, in spite of his
prognosis, aggressively sought and received more experimental treatments—from drugs to a
series of surgeries. The drugs worsened his health immediately; the side effects were horrific.
The morphine, administered through a pump that enabled family to raise dosages to quell his
coughing, attributable to his inability to swallow and made Joe delusional and paranoid. The
surgeries paralyzed the right half of his face, to the point where he could not blink his right eye.
His faced was bandaged in stereotypical mummy fashion, and that entire side of his face
operated on drooped. He had to hold a towel to his face constantly to catch drool. The spread of
the squamous cell tumor required that Joe’s face and neck be completely bandaged for the rest of
his life. Joe was too embarrassed about his appearance to ever leave his home again, and even
close, life-long friends staggered visits and then eventually stopped visiting altogether. Many
who are terminally ill are driven at the end of their lives by a final goal—perhaps one more
wedding anniversary, a favorite holiday, or a visit from a family member or old friend separated
by distance for an opportunity to say good-bye. After dropping his weight from two hundred
and thirty to ninety-five pounds, Joe passed away at sunset on Father’s Day in 1989—more than
seven months beyond what his doctors had predicted the year before.
Never during this saga was palliative care presented meaningfully as a treatment option. 6
As his health deteriorated, the physicians who had promptly returned calls personally over the
4

National Cancer Institute, NCI DICTIONARY OF CANCER TERMS, available at
http://www.cancer.gov/dictionary?CdrID=45368 (last visited Mar. 30, 2013).
5
Id. at http://www.cancer.gov/dictionary?CdrID=597171 (last visited Mar. 30, 2013). This is a “Cancer of the head
and neck that begins in squamous cells (thin, flat cells that form the surface of the skin, eyes, various internal
organs, and the lining of hollow organs and ducts of some glands).” Id.
6
The objective of palliative care is to relieve suffering and to maximize the quality of life, with a focus on
coordinating treatments with patient goals and providing collaborative care that draws from community resources
and varied disciplines—e.g., interdisciplinary teams of physicians, nurses, social workers, chaplains, psychologists,
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fourteen years of successful experimental treatments, and there were clusters of them at times,
became essentially unreachable. Communication was shifted to their nursing staff. Joe’s health
care providers never confronted him about his imminent death, albeit largely because he did not
want to hear and deal with that reality. He never fully accepted the inevitable until a month or so
before it happened. Rather, in a state of denial, he aggressively sought out health care
interventions, however experimental and painful, which he coupled with lots of prayer. Joe
made no financial preparations, including the liquidation of his now over-extended construction
business with a fleet of heavy equipment ranging from backhoes to cranes. He even took on a
large contract during the final year of his life, which he finished to perfection but was never paid
for; the client told him frankly that he was going to die and, given the client’s legal staff, there
was nothing Joe could do about it but accept a small payoff. His family was left with
tremendous financial debt, and they were plagued by it for more than half a decade after his
death. Joe’s widow, who had handled administration of his business from payroll to billing and
account management—down to writing all checks—in addition to raising a family and running
and working at least fifty hours each week at her own business, was left with nothing after
decades of hard work. She started over at the age of forty-six with the burden of settling debts
totaling hundreds of thousands of dollars from Joe’s company and a fifteen-year-old son to finish
raising and educating by herself. During the final months of his life, Joe realized the situation he
was leaving his family in, but it was too late to make any improvements. Joe died with that
worry and a sickening sense that his life was a complete failure.
and physical therapists. Kathleen Tschantz Unroe & Dr. Diane E. Meier, Palliative Care and Hospice:
Opportunities to Improve Care for the Sickest Patients, 25 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 413, 415
(2011). Hospice care is limited to patients with a prognosis of six months or less of life, and who agree to forego
potentially curative and life-prolonging therapies—e.g., when treatment options have been exhausted and the
burdens of treatment outweigh benefits. Nat’l Consensus Project for Quality Palliative Care, Clinical Practice
Guidelines for Quality Palliative Care 11 (2d ed. 2009Dep’t of Health & Human SAervs., Ctrs. For Medicare &
Medicaid Servs., Medicare Hospice Benefits 4 (2010), http//www.medicare.gov/publications/pubs/pdf/02154.pdf R.
Sean Morrison & Diane E. Meier, Clinical Practice: Palliative Care, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2582, 2587 tbl.2
(2004) (describing a review of the “benefit-to-burden ratio for disease modifying treatments”). Palliative care may
be provided within the context of hospice services or outside of them; non-hospice palliative care may be provided
with therapies intended to cure or otherwise prolong life. See generally Meier, Palliative Care, supra. The statutory
criteria for the Medicare hospice benefit are certification by two physicians that the patient’s prognosis is six months
of life or less, and the patient must re linquish insurance coverage for life-prolonging treatments for the terminal
illness. Medicare Hospice Benefit, 42 C.F.R. SS 418.22(b)(2002); Unroe & Meier, supra, at 418; Diane E. Meier,
The Development, Status, and Future of Palliative Care, in ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., SERIES ON HEALTH
POLICY, PALLIATIVE CARE: TRANSFORMING THE CARE OF SERIOUS ILLNESS 3, 18 (2010). “Despite restrictions to the
benefit, growth of hospice has been dramatic over the past few decades. In 2009, an estimated 1.56 million patients
received hospice services, accounting for about 40% of all deaths in the United States.” NAT’L HOSPICE &
PALLIATIVE CARE ORG., NHPCO FACTS AND Figures: HOSPICE CARE IN AMERICA 4 (2010), available at
http://www.nhpco.org/files/public/Statistics_Research/Hospice_Facts_Figures_Oct-2-1-.pdf. Both palliative care
and hospice programs have been credited with improving outcomes while reducing costs:
Multiple studies of palliative care and hospice programs have shown that they improve physical and
psychological symptoms experienced by patients, impact caregiver well-being, and improve patient, family,
and physical satisfaction. Interdisciplinary palliative care and hospice teams reduce medical complications
and expensive hospital utilization by identifying and treating distressing patient symptoms.
Unroe & Meier, Opportunities, supra note 6, at 418-419 (citing multiple sources for each claim). For palliative care
resources, visit the Center to Advance Palliative Care, available at http://www.capc.org/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2013);
The Hertzberg Palliative Care Institute, available at http://www.capc.org/old-tools-for-palliative-careprograms/marketing/sample-brochures/mt-sinai-hertzberg.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2013). Discussion of palliative
care and its general oversight in medical education is discussed infra at notes __ and in the accompanying text.
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Joe’s story illustrates common human reaction when death becomes defined, tangible,
and must be confronted. Since Joe’s death in 1989, medicine has much more aggressively
commingled clinical research with clinical care, and U.S. federal policy and regulation have
promoted the same. 7 Part II of this article addresses the pulsating blending of clinical care with
clinical research.
The question that is the focus of this article is the extent to which regulations to protect
human subjects, and federal policy in general, should promote access to experimental treatments
for the terminally ill or, alternatively, explicitly recognize this group as a “vulnerable
population” 8 and protect it accordingly. Now is an opportune time to address this question:
Decades after implementation, the U.S. is revisiting its fundamental law to protect human
subjects known as the “Common Rule” 9 and is in the midst of implementing the Patient
7

See infra notes __ and accompanying text.
Special considerations apply to protecting the welfare of particularly vulnerable populations such as fetuses,
children, prisoners, pregnant women, and mentally disabled or cognitively impaired persons. See 45 C.F.R. Pt. 46,
§§ B-D. For example, the Common Rule imposes special procedures for obtaining consent and monitoring research
for individuals with diminished mental capacity—e.g. patients with Alzheimer’s and traumatic brain injuries. See
45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a) (defining “handicapped or mentally disable persons” as within the scope of vulnerable
populations). While the explicit regulatory requirement is limited to federally-funded research, it is common for
institutions to elect consistent policies and procedures for all research and to represent the same to the Office for
Human Subject Research Protections (OHRP) within the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) when
they submit assurance applications to qualify for federal funding. See Christine G. Savage, Research Compliance,
COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW MANUAL ch. 7, § 7.2.2 (2012).
9
See generrally Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 76 Fed. Reg. 44512-44531 (July 26, 2011); Extension of
Comment Period, 76 Fed. Reg. 54408 (Sept. 1, 2011). See Announcement, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs.,
HHS Announces Extension of Comment Period on Proposal to Improve Rules Protecting Human Research Subjects
(Sept. 1, 2011), available at http://www.hhs.gov/?ohrp/?newsroom/?announcements/?2011.html. The Department
of Health and Human Services is contemplating substantial, fundamental changes to the Common Rule for the first
time since it was introduced in the 1980s:
The impetus for the proposed changes to the Common Rule rests on the fact that the human subjects
research landscape has undergone dramatic change since the 1980s, when the Common Rule was first
developed. Human subjects research has increased in volume, scope, and application, reaching vast new
areas of research activities. DHHS suggests that the changes seek to strike a balance by enhancing
protections for human subjects who are involved with research while also facilitating research by reducing
burden, delay, and ambiguity inherent in the current system of regulation.
76 Fed. Reg. at 44,512-44,513. Seven general features of the regulatory framework have been identified for reform:
· Utilization of a single IRB of record for all domestic sites on multisite studies;
· Improvement of consent forms and the consent process;
· Establishment of mandatory data security and information protection standards for all Studies that involve
identifiable or potentially identifiable data;
· Establishment of an improved, more systematic approach for the collection and analysis of data on
unanticipated problems and adverse events;
· Extension of federal regulatory protections to all human subjects research, regardless of funding source,
conducted at institutions in the U.S. that receive some federal funding from a Common Rule agency for
human subjects research; and
· Improvement in the harmonization of regulations and related agency guidance.
· While DHHS has not yet published proposed rules, the July 2011 ANPRM signals that the Department is
contemplating significant changes to the Common Rule in the areas outlined and discussed above.
Id. See generrally Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 76 Fed. Reg. 44512-44531 (July 26, 2011). In
addition to the common rule, human subjects are protected by a somewhat parallel set of FDA regulations which
apply to studies carried out under its supervision—e.g., studies to support new indications or uses of FDA-regulated
8
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Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). 10 The latter, recognition that cost increases in
U.S. health care are unsustainable and more than forty million citizens are without health care
insurance, 11 will draw tens of millions more people into the health care system—thereby
exacerbating the policy significance of experimental treatment of the terminally ill, especially as
baby-boomers approach the end of life. 12 The vast amount of health care cost is money spent for

products. See 21 C.F.R. Parts 50, 54, and 56. See also Comparison of FDA and HHS Human Subject Protection
Regulations, available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/gcp/comparison.html. See generally OFFICE FOR HUMAN
RESEARCH PROTECTIONS, DEP’T HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV’S, SPECIAL CLASSES OF SUBJECTS: TERMINALLY ILL
PATIENTS, INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD GUIDEBOOK VI.G (last updated 1993), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/irb/irb_chapter6.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2013). Therefore, fundamental changes
to the common rule are likely to be incorporated into the FDA regulations. As summarized by DHHS, the FDA
regulations:
[R]equire review and approval of protocols by IRBs, financial disclosures of potential conflicts of interest,
and appropriate informed consent procedures. It is worth noting that the FDA conducts both for-cause and
routine surveillance inspections of research institutions and the IRBs charged with reviewing FDAregulated products. While the FDA typically issues warnings when compliance is unsatisfactory, the
agency is also authorized to disqualify research programs or initiate criminal investigations when
warranted.
Proposed Rulemaking, supra, at 44512. See 21 C.F.R. Parts 50, 54, and 56. Human subjects are protected
additionally through direct regulation of conflicts of interest. As explained concisely by DHHS,
concerns that conflicts of interest in research, derived from financial relationships or interests between the
sponsor and the researcher, may affect the rights and welfare of human subjects. Beginning with the DHHS
regulations on the topic in 1995, the federal government has taken the approach that not all financial
interests in research being conducted are prohibited. For example, researchers and universities are
permitted to patent and license the intellectual property developed in federally funded research. Examples
of situations that would pose a conflict of interest, however, include scenarios where a patented product is
tested in clinical trials by the inventor who stands to gain financially if the product is proven safe and
effective. Specific concerns include the possibility that investigators may interpret data more generously
than is warranted or ignore eligibility/exclusion criteria in order to generate more favorable results or obtain
more rapid FDA approval of a product.
Proposed Rulemaking, supra, at 44512 (internal citation omitted). See 35 U.S.C. § 200 et seq.; BARBARA F.
MISHKIN & MONIQUE V. NOLAN, “CONFLICTS OF INTEREST,” IN HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK § 7.11 (West 2006).
Rather than outright prohibition, the federal conflicts regulations generally require disclosure, independent review,
and management of conflicts of interest. In 2011, DHHS issued the first substantive amendments to its conflicts of
interest regulations since the Public Health Service (PHS) regulations on the Responsibility of Applicants for
Promoting Objectivity in Research for which Public Health Service Funding Is Sought and Responsible Prospective
Contractors, 42 C.F.R. pt. 50, were issued in 1995. These 2011 amendments, made effective on September 24,
2012, substantially strengthen the financial conflict of interest rules by lowering reporting thresholds, expanding
reporting obligations, greatly increasing transparency, and requiring institutions that receive federal funding to
develop and enforce policies on conflicts of interest that mandate disclosure, investigation, education, and training.
See 42 C.F.R. § 50.604; Proposed Rulemaking, supra, at 44512-44531.
10
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
11
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE LONG-TERM OUTLOOK FOR HEALTH CARE SPENDING (Nov. 2007),
available at http://moodle2.lsu.edu/pluginfile.php/175576/mod_resource/content/1/CBOHealthSpending.pdf (last
visited Dec. 2012) [hereinafter “CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE REPORT”].
12
The already is a serious doctor shortage in many parts of the country. Editorial, When the Doctor is Not Needed,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2012, at 10; Robert Pear, Doctor Shortage Proves Obstacle to Obama Goals, N.Y.TIMES (Apr.
27, 2009), at A1. The extent of the problem often correlates with poverty and disproportionate concentration of the
approximately 50 million Americans without health insurance and the tens of million more who are underinsured.
Editorial, Not Needed, supra, at 10. Louisiana is a prime example.
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care at the end-of-life. 13 Part III of this article addresses this dilemma in a discussion of the
competing perspectives of patient, clinical researcher, drug developer, and regulator at the end of
life.
Part IV of the article introduces a law-policy proposal to modify human subject
protection law and policy to enhance recognition of and responsiveness to the vulnerability of the
terminally ill. This proposal is grounded in the seductiveness of science, especially when
confronted by death, the care-at-all-costs culture of U.S. medicine, good medicine
considerations, and the reality that health care resources are limited and the U.S. health care
system must be rescued from a bleak financial future. 14

II.

Comingling Clinical Research and Clinical Care at the
End of Life
"Technological medicine sometimes seems to promote a view of death as an event that
can be deferred indefinitely rather than as a normal, natural part of life."
Lynne Ann DeSpelder & Albert Lee Strickland 15

From the 1980s to the present, in sync with advancement of the genomics revolution in
the development of drugs and other therapeutics, 16 the U.S. has liberalized its experimental drug
policies to increase access to clinical research as health care treatment. 17 In 1987, the U.S.
codified and expanded a Compassionate Use Exemption which, at the FDA’s discretion on a
case-by-case basis, allows individuals to realize health care use of drugs and other therapeutics
still in the midst of the FDA review process. 18 A Treatment IND Exemption was added to
13

Just 5 percent of the population is responsible for almost 50 percent of health care costs, and those costs are
concentrated at the end of life. See generally, LONG-TERM OUTLOOK, supra note 10. See David Gruber & Paul
Rundell, Restructuring and PPACA, 44 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 95, 96 (Sept. 2012).
14
See generally CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE REPORT, supra note 11.
15
LYNNE ANN DESPEIDER & ALBERT LEE STRICKLAND, THE LAST DANCE: ENCOUNTERING DEATH AND DYING
(1983).
16
See generally Symposium, The Genomics Revolution? Science, Law, and Policy, 66 LA. L. REV. 1 (2005)
(centennial issue).
17
Linda Katherine Leibfarth, Giving the Terminally Ill Their Due (Process): A Case for Expanded Access to
Experimental Drugs through the Political Process, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1281, 1282 (2008). Measures to increase
access to experimental treatments were introduced in the context of broader efforts to accelerate drug review and
approval. In 1992, the FDA issued regulations to codify acceptance of surrogate endpoints meaning that, in place
of evidence of patient survival which may require considerable time to establish, the agency accepts evidence of
physiological and biochemical data indicative of extended patient survival. 21 C.F.R § 315.500. The same year,
Congress enacted—and subsequently reauthorized in five-year intervals—the Prescription Drug User Fee Act
(PDUFA), 21 U.S.C.A. Sec. Sec. 379g-379h . PDUFA established a cash flow of user fees from new drug sponsors
that has enabled the agency to hire hundreds of additional reviewers. In 1997, Congress enacted FDAMA, which
expanded the mission of the FDA to include efficiency along with safety and efficacy. See infra notes __and
accompanying text. The net effect was a drop in the average new drug approval time from twenty-seven to fourteen
months between 1993 and 2001. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-958, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN,
COMMITTEE ON HEALTH, EDUCATION, LABOR, AND PENSIONS, U.S. SENATE, EFFECT OF USER FEES ON DRUG
APPROVAL TIMES, WITHDRAWALS, AND OTHER AGENCY ACTIVITIES 3 (2002).
18
21 C.F.R. Sec. 312.34. Many credit this expansion to the onset of the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s. See, e.g.,
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provide the same for groups. 19 While Compassionate Use applications are decided on a case-bycase basis, a Treatment IND (again, pertaining to groups of patients), adds a treatment protocol
to an existing investigational new drug application (IND) that authorizes the clinical research
drawn upon. 20 Patients who satisfy the protocol are, with physician support, candidates for the
experimental treatment covered. 21 The FDA requires drug candidates to demonstrate
meaningful potential of therapeutic benefit before approving use outside the scope of clinical
trials, and the agency applies varying standards for serious and life-threatening diseases. 22 The
standard for serious diseases is sufficient evidence of safety and effectiveness to support the use,
which typically requires Phase III data. 23 The standard for life-threatening diseases is that data
must be sufficient to reasonably conclude that the drug may be effective for the intended use in
the target patient population without exposing those patients to an unreasonable and significant
additional risk of illness or injury, which typically requires meaningful Phase II data. 24
In addition, with enactment of the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of
1997 (FDAMA), 25 the U.S. introduced an internet site that tracks efficacy studies under FDAapproved investigational new drug (IND) applications and makes that information accessible to
the general public. 26 Subsequently, the U.S. expanded the effort with enactment of section 801 of
the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA) of 2007. 27 Through this site and
a range of other sites, including the NIH Cancer trial site and private sites, “Clinical research has

Michael D. Greenberg, AIDS, Experimental Drug Approval, and the FDA New Drug Screening Process, 3 N.Y.U.J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y, 295, 296-297 (2000); Leibfarth, supra note 17, at 1282. However, based upon this author’s
work in the field during this time, there were several other important influences, including: (1) expansion of the
number and volume of a range of political voices from patient advocacy, professional, and trade organization
groups, including the Biotechnology Industry Organization, coupled with explosive advancement of information
technology; (2) increased unification of the European pharmaceutical market through establishment of the European
Medicines Agency; (3) reports that the U.S. lagged behind Europe in new drug approvals—the so-called “drug lag”;
(4) frustration over the institutional memory of the FDA and lack of regulatory transparency; and (5) the rapid
expansion of a meaningful biotechnology commercial sector and its integration with the pharmaceutical sector.
19
21 C.F.R. Sec. 312.34. The four conditions for a treatment IND to qualify are set forth at 21 C.F.R. Sec. 312.34:
(1) the drug must be intended to treat a serious or life-threatening disease; (2) there cannot be a satisfactory
alternative treatment; (3) the drug must be in advanced FDA trials (efficacy trials); and (4) the drug sponsor must be
pursuing market approval. In recent years, there has been a major movement by patient advocacy groups to increase
access yet further. See infra notes __ and accompanying text (Abigail Alliance). The FDA also has a “parallel
track” to increase access to drugs in the early stages of discovery, but the mechanism has been used very sparingly.
See generally 57 Fed. Reg. 13259 (Apr. 15, 1992); OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS, TERMINALLY ILL
PATIENTS, supra note 9.
20
See id. at __.
21
Id. at __.
22
See generally OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS, GUIDEBOOK, supra note 19, at VI.G.
23
21 CFR 312.34(a).
24
312.34(b)(2), 312.34(b)(3).
25
Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2295 (1997).
26
U.S. National Library of Medicine, Fact Sheet, ClinicalTrials.gov, available at
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/pubs/factsheets/clintrial.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2013); Sarah K. Keitt, Sex & Gender:
The Politics, Policy, and Practice of Medical Research, 3 253, 266-67 (2003) (observing that databases like
www.clinicaltrials.gov, www.womancando.org, and www.centerwatch.com identify ongoing trials, participation
criteria, and participation considerations).
27
Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823, 904-905 (2007). See infra notes __ and accompanying text.
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entered an era of transparency, meaning that information about clinical trials is online and
accessible to the general public, and the public is seeking access.” 28
Moreover, in 2000, the U.S. introduced federal law and policy in favor of Medicare
reimbursement for clinical research as care. 29 Specifically, “On June 7, 2000, the President of
the United States issued an executive memorandum directing the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to `explicitly authorize [Medicare] payment for routine patient care costs...and costs due
to medical complications associated with participation in clinical trials.’” 30 Medicare funnels
money into states’ private insurance markets, therefore Medicare reimbursement decisions often
have broad impact on the private commercial insurance sector. 31 The “greying of America”
suggests that this influence is bound to increase. 32
The relevant government law and policy rests upon advancement of and the public’s faith
in the underlying science, the primary fuel for the fusion of clinical research and clinical care, 33
and this trend is likely to continue. 34 The amount of advanced clinical research underway is
unprecedented. 35 Over the last six years, the number of subjects typical for phase III trials,
advanced trials leading into applications for new drug approvals, has increased from 3,000 to
20,000—doubling their cost (now typically $50-100 million). 36 Given the specificity and
complexity of human genetics and the industry’s reliance on group design—statistics, group
averages and medians—in clinical research, 37 the scope of phase III trials likely will continue to

28

Michael J. Malinowski, Law, Policy, and Market Implications of Genetic Profiling in Drug Development, 2 HOUS.
J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 31, 51 (2002). See, e.g., www.cancer.gov/clinicaltrials, www.centerwatch and
www.womancando.org.
29
Health Care Financing Admin., Medicare Coverage Policy-Clinical Trials, Final National Coverage Decision,
available at http:// www.hcfa.gov/coverage/8d2.htm (last visited Jun. 2011); DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMIN., HCFA FACT SHEET, MEDICARE COVERAGE ROUTINE COSTS OF BENEFICIARIES IN
CLINICAL TRIALS (2000), available at http:// www.hcfa.gov/medlearn/ctfs13.pdf (stating that Medicare beneficiaries
would not lose their coverage by enrolling in clinical trials in an effort to promote innovation).
30
See generally Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medical Clinical Trial Policies, available at
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Coverage/ClinicalTrialPolicies/index.html?redirect=/ClinicalTrialPolicies/ (last
visited Mar. 30, 2013). On July 10, 2006, CMS opened a reconsideration of its national coverage determination on
clinical trials for clarification. Id.
31
See PBS, HEALTHCARE CRISIS: WHO’S AT RISK? (2000).
32
See generally CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE REPORT, supra note 11.
33
See Michael J. Malinowski, Law, Policy, and Market Implications of Genetic Profiling in Drug Development, 2
HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 31, 52 (2002).
34
See infra notes __ and accompanying text.
35
See CTR. FOR HEALTH & PHARM. LAW & POLICY, SETON HALL LAW, WHITE PAPER: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN
CLINICAL TRIAL RECRUITMENT & ENROLLMENT: A CALL FOR INCREASED OVERSIGHT 5-6 (2009); Michael J.
Malinowski & Grant G. Gautreaux, Drug Development—Stuck in a State of Puberty? Regulatory Reform of Human
Clinical Research to Raise Responsiveness to the Reality of Human Variability, 56 ST. LOUIS L. J. 363, 393-394
(2012). See generally Matthew Herper, The Truly Staggering Cost of Inventing New Drugs, FORBES, Feb. 10, 2012,
available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2012/02/10/the-truly-staggering-cost-of-inventing-newdrugs/ (last visited April 8, 2013); Appendices I & II. See also infra note 79 and accompanying text.
36
Miho Nagano, Big Pharma Looks for a Fix, INVESTOR’S BUSINESS DAILY, Sept. 29, 2008, at A9.
37
See generally Malinowski & Gautreaux, State of Puberty?, supra note 35; Michael J. Malinowski & Grant G.
Gautreaux, All that is Gold Does Not Glitter in Human Clinical Research: A Law-Policy Proposal to Brighten the
Global “Gold Standard” for Drug Research and Development, 45 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 185 (2012).
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expand. 38 In any event, those who are terminally ill will seek access, 39 and existing government
law and policy encourages them to do so. Manipulating the scope of trials under group design is
a means to realize the desired averages and medians.
The law-policy challenge is to promote responsible clinical research and experimental
treatments while grounding over responsiveness to experimental treatments by patients,
providers, and researchers at the expense of quality of patient care, good medicine, and full
voluntary informed consent. More than ninety percent of new drug candidates fail, and clinical
research generally is a grasping reach from the equivalent of quality, tried and tested, clinical
care. Clinical research is a transition from health care potential to quality treatment reality,
which generally necessitates drug approval and years of physician-patient experience in the
general population. 40
The promotion of responsible clinical research is especially important today to transition
drug development out of its doldrums and to realize the human health potential of the
extraordinary advances of human genome-related basic research and enabling technologies over
the last few decades (genomics, proteomics and myriad other disciplines). 41 In spite of new drug
disappoints, there is ample proof of principle in the new drug pipeline—for example, drugs that
target genetic aberrations fundamental to a range of cancers independent of where they originate,
juxtaposed against “personalized” approaches to treating cancers. An example of the former are
variations of a drug being developed in competition among Merck, Roche, and Sanofi to restore
a mechanism that causes badly damaged cancer cells to self-destruct regardless of their origin. 42
A noted illustration of the latter is the work of Dr. Ralph Steinman, who with a colleague was coawarded the 2011 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine for his work battling his own
pancreatic cancer through treatments generated from his body to reprogram his immune cells: 43
Now doctors can scan each tumor for clues about its DNA and use those clues to
determine its strengths and weaknesses. . . . . This “personalized” approach to treating
38

This observation presumes adherence to the group design science standard and no dramatic science advancement
intervention in the near future. Cf. Malinowski & Gautreaux, State of Puberty?, supra note 35; Malinowski &
Gautreaux, All that is Gold, supra note 37.
39
See infra notes __ and accompanying text.
40
See Herper, supra note 35. See generally Barbara A. Noah, Bioethical Malpractice: Risk and Responsibility in
Human Research, 7 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 175, 176 (2004) (distinguishing research from treatment;
describing research as transition from health care potential to actual medical treatment).
41
See generally Malinowski & Gautreaux, State of Puberty?, supra note 35; Malinowski & Gautreaux, All that is
Gold, supra note 37.
42
Gina Kolata, New Drugs Aim to Make Cells Destroy Cancer, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2012, at 1, 23. Beyond the
health care implications of multiplying treatment options for a broad range of major cancer patient groups and
pooling research resources, from financial support to human subjects, treatment windfalls may reach those afflicted
with rare cancers ignored by commercial drug makers. See generally id.
43
Daniel Engber, How One Scientist’s Losing Battle Against His Own Cancer Might Save the Rest of Us, NEW
YORK TIMES MAG., Dec. 23, 2011, 32-38. Dr. Steinman’s family was notified via a message delivered to Dr.
Steinman’s Blackberry three days after his death, which was years beyond his prognosis when diagnosed. Id. at 34.
Although the Nobel Foundation does not allow posthumous awards, Dr. Steinman’s was allowed to stand. Id. Dr.
Steinman served as both scientist and human subject in a clinical trial of one, but with broad human health
implications: “It is known as cancer immunotherapy, and its offshoots have just now begun to make their way into
the clinic, and treatments have been approved for tumors of the skin and of the prostate.” Id.
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cancer, which subdivides the classic types according to distortions in their genes, has
been growing at a rapid pace. In the past few years, laboratories financed by the
government have set out to build a comprehensive atlas of the cancer genome—to collect
500 tumors from each of 25 kinds of the disease and then to analyze their DNA and RNA
at a cost of more than $100 million a year. The advent of inexpensive genome
sequencing has produced a gold rush in the commercial sector too, with the promise that
anyone’s tumor can be sliced and processed and analyzed, until its genetic fingerprint is
decoded. 44
FDAMA prioritizes research to develop therapeutics for treating life-threatening and
otherwise seriously debilitating diseases that presently are untreatable, or for which no sufficient
standard of care is available. Compassionate Uses and Treatment INDs, also responsive to these
situations, are thereby reinforced through the priorities codified through enactment of
FDAMA. 45

III.

The Competing Perspectives of Patient, Physician, Clinical
Researcher, Drug Developer, and Regulator at the End of Life

“How can it be coherent to insist on maintaining hope when life, the very object of the hope
one is trying to maintain, will thereby be sacrificed?”
Paul T. Menzel 46
Reducing matters literally of life and death in health care to law and policy inevitably
raises controversy and debate—as they should. Patients, physicians, clinical researchers, drug
developers, and regulators all have vested interests in law-policy that impacts access to
experimental treatments for the terminally ill, as was illustrated vividly in recent years by Abigail
Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenback 47 and the controversy the
case generated. 48
Abigail Alliance (“the Alliance”) challenged FDA regulations that limited access to the
experimental drugs Iressa and Erbitux for the named patient plaintiff, Abigail, and other

44

Id. at 35. The recent Supreme Court decision, Assoc. For Molecular Pathology et al. v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., No.
12-398 (2013) , now makes it possible to gather up clusters of allele (genetic variation) probes for particular
diseases—for example, specific cancers—or even a range of diseases for genetic testing screens of medical value
unprecedented thus far.
45
See FDAMA, supra note 25 and accompanying test. See Malinowski & Gautreaux, State of Puberty?, supra note
35, at 379-81 (addressing the codification of this presumption under section 506B and the “fast track” provisions of
FDAMA).
46
Paul T. Menzel, The Value of Life at the End of Life: A Critical Assessment of Hope and Other Factors, 39 J. L.
MED. & ETHICS 215, 216 (2011).
47
495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc), aff’g No. 03-1601 (RMU), 2004 WL 3777340 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2004),
rev’g 445 F.3d 470 (D.D. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008).
48
See generally Leibfarth, supra note 17; Priya Brandes, Comment, Regulation of Drugs: A Death Sentence for the
Terminally Ill?, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 1149, 1156-1163 (2012). See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Won’t Hear Appeal on
Drugs for Terminally Ill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2008.
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plaintiffs who were excluded from the clinical trials. 49 The Alliance asserted that drug sponsors
should be permitted to make investigational drugs available to terminally ill patients with no
other treatment options once Phase I clinical trials (trials for safety only, and conducted with
healthy volunteers) have been completed. 50 Drawing from Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of
Health, 51 in which the Supreme Court recognized a fundamental liberty interest in the
individual’s right to refuse life-sustaining treatments even if that decision accelerates the end of
life, 52 the Alliance alleged that terminally ill individuals have a similar liberty interest that
entitles them to access experimental drugs. “Essentially, the panel argued that a liberty interest
in choosing death by refusing treatment is akin to the right to choose a fighting chance at
prolonged life.” 53 The common denominator, according to the Alliance, is a right to control
one’s medical care at the end of their life. The Alliance also drew from the holdings in Roe v.
Wade 54 and Planned Parenthood v. Casey 55 that a Woman has a right to terminate a pregnancy at
any stage when necessary to preserve her life or health to propose a right to “medical selfdefense.” 56 In addition, the Alliance drew from Gonzales v. Oregon, 57 in which the Court, as in
Roe, showed strong deference to the practice of medicine and medical choices made by
individuals with their doctors, holding that physicians have a right to use FDA-approved drugs
consistent with the approval even if the use hastens the death of patients. 58 Moreover, the
Alliance argued that, “in connection with [their] own personal health-care, [the] FDA ha[d]
offended the constitutional right of privacy.” 59
The Supreme Court denied the Alliance’s petition for certiorari and thereby through
silence affirmed the D.C. Circuit court’s en banc holding that, although physicians are entitled to
prescribe in accordance with FDA drug approvals (all that is on the pharmacy shelves is for use
at doctor discretion provided they do not engage in known harm), there is no affirmative right to
49

Abigail lost her battle against cancer on June 9, 2001, years before the case in which she was the named plaintiff
reached a final resolution. See Official Site, Alliance for Better Access to Development Drugs, available at
http://www.abigail-alliance.org/story.php (last visited Apr. 1, 2013). The mission and work of the Alliance continue
on. See id. at http://www.abigail-alliance.org/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2013).
50
Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. McClenllan, No. 03-1601 (RMU) (D.D.C. Aug. 30,
2004), 2004 WL 3777340, at 27.
51
497 U.S. 261, 286-87 (1990) (“[W]e do not think the Due Process Clause requires the State to repose judgment on
these matters with anyone but the patient herself….[T]he State may choose to defer only to those wishes [of the
patient], rather than confide the decision to close family members.”).
52
The Court’s decision recognized the doctrine of substituted judgment—an obligation to step into the life of the
individual and make decisions about health care intervention based upon what the individual would have decided.
See generally Louise Harmon, Fall off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE
L.J. 1 (1990).
53
Leibfarth, Expanded Access, supra note 48, at 1296 (2008).
54
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
55
Planned Parenthood of Southwestern Pa. v. Casey, 505 US 833 (1992).
56
See Leibfarth, supra note 17, at 1298-1300; see also Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited
Experimental Therapies, and Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1913 (2007).
57
546 U.S. 243, 126 S.Ct. 904 (2006). The case was a Bush Administration challenge to an Oregon law allowing
physicians, in response to patient requests and when certain requirements are satisfied, to prescribe prescription pain
medications in a manner that accelerates the end of life
58
Id. at __. Note that subsequently, in Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1633 (2007), the Court upheld a
congressional ban on partial birth abortion even when a woman and her doctor conclude the procedure is medically
necessary. Id. at 1633.
59
438 F. Supp. at 1301.

12

force the FDA to expand access to drug candidates under its review. 60 The Alliance’s foundation
argument, rejected by the D.C. Circuit, was that the FDA’s standard for access to experimental
pharmaceuticals interferes with fundamental rights, therefore is subject to a strict scrutiny
standard of review, and imposes an undue burden on those who are terminally ill and could
possibly benefit from experimental treatments blanketed under the regulatory protection. 61 The
D.C. Circuit relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Rutherford, 62 in which
plaintiffs argued that drug regulations to protect the public did not have any reasonable
application to terminally ill patients. The Rutherford Court disagreed, holding that “the concept
of safety . . . is not without meaning for terminal patients. For the terminally ill, as for anyone
else, a drug is unsafe if its potential for inflicting death or physical injury is not offset by the
possibility of therapeutic benefit.” 63 The Court’s rationale was that the language of the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) is plain and unambiguous, and whether there should be an
exemption from protections for the terminally ill is a question of statutory, not judicial,
interpretation. 64
The Abigail litigation has and presumably will continue to inspire legislative proposals. 65
In 2005, the Access, Compassion, Care, and Ethics for Seriously Ill Patients Act was introduced
in the U.S. Senate with Abigail Alliance support, 66 and an identical bill was introduced in the
house. 67 The crux of these legislative proposals was to grant seriously ill patients a right to
access experimental drugs after phase I testing, and provisions included a prohibition on placebo
(no treatment) control groups in human clinical trials, a waiver of liability for providing the
terminally ill with experimental drugs to provide an incentive for drug sponsor responsiveness,
and restrictions on the marketing of experimental drugs to the terminally ill to quell opponents’
concerns. 68

60

Abigail v. Von Eschenbach, supra note 50. See Greenhouse, Justices Won’t, supra note 35.
Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 701, citing 21 CFR sec. 312.34(b)(3) (2008). The Alliance also challenged FDA
regulations that prohibit drug sponsors from profiting from the sale of experimental drugs; sponsors may recoup
costs only. See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 701, citing 21 CFR sec. 312.7(d)(3) (2008).
62
442 U.S. 544 (1979).
63
Id. at 555-56. The Court emphasized section 505 of the FDCA, which requires the FDA to assess “whether or
not [a] drug is safe for use and whether such drug is effective in use” before approving its introduction into interstate
commerce. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2000).
64
442 U.S. at 551. The Court held that “Exceptions to clearly delineated statutes will be implied only where
essential to prevent `absurd results’ or consequences obviously at variance with the policy of the enactment as a
whole.” Id. at 552. The D.C. Circuit held the same—that the issue is best debated through the political process, not
the judiciary: Abigail Alliance v. Von Eschenback, supra note 34, 495 F.3d at 713.
65
Again, the Abigail Aliance continues its work. See supra note 49.
66
S. 1956, 109th Cong. (2005). S. 1956, 109th Cong. (2005), available at http://
www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s109-1956. The bill was reintroduced in May 2008. S. 3046, 110th Cong.
(2008), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-3046 (tracking history of the bill).
67
H.R. 6303, 109th Cong. (2005), available at http:// www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-6303. The bill
was reintroduced in June 2008. H.R. 6270, 110th Cong. (2008), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd? bill=h110-6270.
68
See Leibfarth, supra note 17, at 1309-1315.
61
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In the years since the Abigail decision, the scope of clinical research has unfolded over
health care dramatically, 69 as has the public’s perception that experimental therapeutics are an
extension of clinical care options. 70 Joe’s story is exponentially more prevalent today than when
he passed away in 1989. 71 The U.S. population is greying and overcoming acute conditions to
live longer with chronic ones demanding constant care. 72 Experimental treatment of the
terminally ill and inclusion of the terminally ill in clinical research remain viable legislative
matters and, in fact, ones much more compelling than in the past given the advancement and
seduction of science. The varied and often competing perspectives of patient, physician, clinical
researcher, drug developer, and regulator demand focused attention.

A. The Patient’s Perspective
Terminally ill individuals without standard of care treatment options generally weigh the
risks and benefits of experimental treatments in a wholly distinguishable manner relative to the
general population. 73 Often risks associated with experimentation are perceived as negligible
provided there is any possibility of treatment and postponement of death. 74 Imminent death
shifts the reference point for cost-benefit analysis: a premium is placed on a month of additional
life that far exceeds the value placed on that same month tacked onto a period of years: 75
[Ernest Becker] and colleagues suggest that four factors explain the high value people
appear to put on life at the end of life. (1) Opportunity costs are low because assets that
will prospectively remain after death have less value to the living [but terminally ill]
patient than assets normally do. (2) Compromised quality of life has less effect in lowing
one’s perceived value of life when it is the only quality one’s life can have yet. (3)
Others, not only the person approaching death, see benefit in marginally longer life. In
academic terms, the extended life has a “social value.” People around the one whose life
is ending are often heavily invested emotionally in extending life. More distant parties
such as altruistic taxpayers and insurance subscribers, for example, can also see benefit in
providing extended life in the face of death. Various interest groups benefit from the
provision of care and perception of that. (4) Preserving hope by pursuing even unlikely
and statistically small life extensions has value that is reflected in higher valuation of life.
If hope is defined as “the current consumption of future survival,” then “increased
survival in the future is . . . [legitimately] ‘double counted’ as . . . having a current
consumption value in addition to its traditional future consumption value.” 76
69

See supra note __ and accompanying text (an increase from 3,000 to 10,000 for a typical phase III trial); See
generally SETON HALL, WHITE PAPER, supra note 28.
70
See generally supra Part II.
71
See supra notes __ and accompanying text.
72
See supra notes __ and accompanying text.
73
The plaintiffs in Abigail Alliance articulated this argument. See supra notes __ and accompanying text.
74
Id. See also Leibfarth, supra note 17, at 1288.
75
Paul T. Menzel, The Value of Life at the End of Life: A Critical Assessment of Hope and Other Factors, 39 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 216-17 (2011).
76
Id. at 216-217 quoting BECKER K. MURCHY & T. PHIOPSON, NATIONAL BUREA OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, THE
VALUE OF LIFE NEAR ITS END AND TERMINAL CARE, NBER WORKING PAPER NO. 13333 (2007). See also KUHL,
WANT, supra note 106, at 4-5 (“The moment someone is told that their illness will likely result in death, time
changes.”).
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U.S. culture prioritizes life, youth, and productivity, which feeds a fear of death and
dying. Jolting advances in medical technology, actual and perceived, give many who are
terminally ill hope, and it has created the concept of “invisible death.” 77 There is a belief,
drawing masses in search of hope in ever-expanding numbers, that death is avoidable through
investment in research and science. This faith stigmatizes death as failure, something to be
hidden and avoided, and creates compulsion to exhaust all medical science resources—escalating
pressure to undertake whatever can be done medically to fend off death: 78
If it is presumed that death can be defeated by science, then when it does occur it
theoretically could have been prevented and thus must reflect a failure—of the family to
find the right doctor; of the patient to take care of himself; of the doctors or hospitals to
know and provide the right treatments; and of society to invest enough in research. . . . .
This stigma of death as failure, the widely held belief that modern medicine can perform
miracles in the battle against death, and the multi-year course of the chronic illness
responsible for 75% of deaths in the United States have fostered an environment where
over 70% of deaths in the United States occur in institutions—hospitals and nursing
homes. The hospital is believed to have the people and technology needed to keep death
at bay. Further, the hospital and the nursing home offer respite for families from the
difficult, often many years long, work of caring for a seriously ill person. 79
Consequently, death in the U.S. has become a ritual encompassing prolonged hospital
stays, many in intensive care units. 80 This ritual gives families and health care providers
comfort—a sense that “We did everything possible.” A “We cannot do more for you medically”
from a health care provider triggers confrontation with mortality and a self-preservation
instinct. 81 This fear of death has a legacy as long as humankind, and one that lingers in
perpetuity: “[M]an has not basically changed. Death is still a fearful, frightening happening, and
the fear of death is a universal fear even if we think we have mastered it on many levels.” 82 As
observed by Pulitzer Prize recipient Ernest Becker, “And so we can understand what seems like
an impossible paradox: the ever-present fear of death in the normal biological functioning of our
instinct of self-preservation, as well as our utter obliviousness to this fear in our conscious life . .
. .” 83 As explained by Becker, the human condition of denying death is reinforced by science
and narcissism:
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PHILLIPE ARIES, THE HOUR OF OUR DEATH 575 (1981). This point in sharpened when one compares the fear of
death in contemporary U.S. culture with ancestral celebration of death as the ultimate rite of passage to elevate to a
higher existence. ERNEST BECKER, THE DENIAL OF Death ix (1973) (Pulitzer Prize Winner for General Nonfiction
1974).
78
Id. at 575.
79
Kathleen Tschantz Unroe & Dr. Diane E. Meier, Palliative Care and Hospice: Opportunities to Improve Care for
the Sickest Patients, 25 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 413, 416 (2011).
80
See generally BECKER, supra note 77.
81
Id. at 15-17.
82
KUBLER-ROSS, DYING, supra note 82, at 4.
83
BECKER, supra note 77, at 17. For discussion of the unconscious attitude towards death, see SIGMUND FREUD,
Thoughts for the Times on War and Death, COLLECTED PAPERS, vol. 4, pp. 316-317 (1959).
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As Aristotle somewhere put it: luck is when the guy next to you gets hit with the arrow.
Twenty-five hundred years of history have not changed man’s basic narcissism; most of
the time, for most of us, this is still a workable definition of luck. It is one of the meaner
aspects of narcissism that we feel that practically everyone is expendable except
ourselves. Our organism is bred to fill the world all alone, even if our mind shrinks at the
thought. This narcissism is what keeps men marching into point-blank fire in wars: at
heart one doesn’t feel that he will die, he only feels sorry for the man next to him.
Freud’s explanation for this was that the unconscious does not know death or time: in
man’s physiochemical, inner organic recesses he feels immortal. 84
Folded into daily life, a major weakness in this narcissistic analysis in the health care
context is that it assumes equal durations of lifetime are comparable in content and quality,
which typically is not the case—as illustrated vividly by the last nine months or so of Joe’s life. 85
Another is distortion of the health care market attributable to a disconnection between the costs
and value of services and patients’ end-of-life perspectives, and often those of their providers as
well. Experimental treatments widen this disconnect, and profoundly so in many cases. When
coverage is a beacon in the bleak, enveloping shadow of death, there tends to be demand for
invasive care at all costs, regardless of the actual impact on care and the quality of life:
Insured patients and often their providers as well, have the incentive to use every bit of
care that has even the slimmest, pie-in-the sky prospect of benefit, regardless of its cost.
People see themselves as having paid their insurance “dues” already, and their future
premiums will not increase by more than micro-pennies because of their one current use
of marginal care. . . . Since providers are seen to be the jury expert professionals in
delivering care, patients tend to defer to their recommendations, allowing them to create
much of their own demand. 86
Congress is attempting to address this problem under PPACA through establishment of
an Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB) to assess health care outcomes, but a segment
of the public and providers alike have balked at the effort—labeling the measure as “death
panels.” 87 An at times cult-level faith in science and technology drives the need for regulatory
intervention to communicate the realities of treatment and quality of life implications—so that
individuals are better positioned to make rational decisions and to control the end of their lives
with grounded insight. 88 Such an intervention is essential to improve end-of-life decision
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Ernest Becker elaborated on the impact of narcissism on the human condition. BECKER, supra note 77, at 2-3.
See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
86
Menzel, supra note 75, at 17.
87
ALIGN America, Does the Independent Payment Advisory Board = “Death Panels”?, available at
http://www.alignamerica.com/node/63 (last visited Apr. 6, 2013). Many in the public and press have commingled
IPAB with another “death panel” provision on palliative care directly removed from the final version of the PPACA.
See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
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See generally DOROTHY NELKIN & MARTY SUSAN LINDEE, THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE GENE AS CULTURAL ICON
(1996); DOROTHY NELKIN & MARY SUSAN LINDEE, SELLING SCIENCE: HOW THE PRESS COVERS SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY (1995). With the success of the Human Genome Project (a rough draft of the map of the human
genome was announced in 2003, and the map has been improved substantially since), faith in medical technology
has been enhanced. See Press Release, Nat'l Human Genome Research Inst., International Consortium Completes
85
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making—to infuse realistic decision making with thoughtful consideration of quality of life and
comfort at the end-of-life. This intervention is essential in a society that, where the individual
holds a contractual obligation to provide insurance coverage, promotes the possibility of
extending the duration of life at all health care and quality of life costs—a society that breeds and
feeds a vulnerability to live fates worse than death in which experimental treatment is embraced
regardless of the associated suffering and at the cost of life resolution and closure. Even with the
FDA’s portfolio of market failures such as Vioxx, Avandia, and Accutane after several years on
the market and scathing evaluations from the Institutes of Medicine and Government
Accountability Offices of the FDA’s regulatory performance once drugs are on the market, 89
faith in technology endures. Fear of death is coupled with at times desperate belief in medical
technology. In the U.S., epicenter of the global genomic revolution in biomedical science, the
uncertainty associated with “experimental” fuels hope—a “beat death” lottery ticket with odds
inflated by perception —especially when conditions are terminal and standard of care treatments
fail, are limited, or simply do not exist. Factors such as fear and faith certainly are not mutually
inclusive with or exclusive of hope, but these influences often inflate the latter to the point of
skewing patient intake of information and overall judgment. 90 At the very least, death is more
difficult to confront in an age of technology. 91 Coupled with an explosion in the amount of
clinical research underway, 92 FDAMA introduced a presumption in favor of putting new drugs
on the market with clinical trial conditions that often are not enforced. 93 The prevalence of
technology and its promise skews perception and appreciation of the clinical research reality that
most drugs will fail—meaning that they will not prove helpful and, in fact, often prove
harmful. 94 As illustrated by the last year of Joe’s life, 95 comfort and quality time often are
sacrificed for invasive care, hospitalizations, and increased human suffering.

B. The Perspectives of Physician and Clinical Researcher
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http://www.iom.edu/~/ media/Files/Report%20Files/2006/The-Future-of-Drug-Safety/futureofdrugsafety_
reportbrief.pdf.
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See generally Menzel, supra note 61, at 218-219.
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KUBLER-ROSS, supra note 82, at 7 (“I think there are many reasons for this flight away from facing death calmly.
One of the most important facts is that dying nowadays is more gruesome in many ways, namely, more lonely,
mechanical, and dehumanized; at times it is even difficult to determine technically when the time of death has
occurred.”).
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See supra notes 36 and accompanying text.
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Process, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 295, 296-297 (2000), citing Sheila R. Shulman & Jeffrey S. Brown, The
Food and Drug Administration’s Early Access and Fast-Track Approval Initiatives: How Have They Worked?, 50
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 503, 505 (1995). 506(b)
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$4 billion to $11 billion. Id. For company-by-company data on new drug spending, see Appendices I and II.
See Leibfarth, supra note 17, at 1303.
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The legislation that empowers and enables the FDA embodies assurances of deference to
the practice of medicine—a reflection of the medical profession’s profound influence throughout
most of the 20th century. 96 Although the discretion of the medical profession has been checked
increasingly over the last few decades by conditions on reimbursement, health care management,
and consumer pressures, physicians have and continue to enjoy “an especially persuasive claim
to authority. Unlike the law and the clergy, [the medical profession] enjoys close bonds with
modern science, and at least for most of the last century, scientific knowledge has held a
privileged status in the hierarchy of belief.” 97 Physicians hold extraordinary discretion to
prescribe drugs that reach pharmacy shelves off label regardless of limits to the scope of clinical
data that puts them there. 98 The FDA’s standard for efficacy is to be better than nothing (beat a
placebo or sugar pill), new drug sponsors decide what uses they will apply for and control the
core breadth of their clinical research knowing that reaching market invites off label uses, and
the end result is heavy reliance on actual physician-patient experience over several years to
meaningfully understand pharmaceuticals. 99 This reliance is dangerous given physician aversion
to reporting adverse events. 100 Doctors do not speak out enough when treatments go badly due
to the administrative burden of doing so, conflicts of interest in an age of industry-academiagovernment collaboration, and fear of professional and legal ramifications driven by awareness
that drug sponsors will protect their investments. 101
96
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accompanying text), expressly states that “FDA has no authority to regulate how physicians prescribe approved
drugs in the context of their medical practice. Physicians prescribing off-label uses of approved drugs is not within
the jurisdiction of the FDA.” H.R. Rep. No. 105-310, at 60 (1997).
97
STARR, supra note 96, at 4.
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busy for the paperwork.”). See also 60 Minutes, Prescription Disaster, Nov. 14, 2004 (interview with clinical
researchers who published negative data about Vioxx in peer-reviewed literature and were subjected to professional
attacks from Merck, the drug’s manufacturer). An alternative to FDA reporting is to gather data and publish
concerns in peer-reviewed medical journals such as The Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), the
New England Journal of Medicine, and The Lancet, but discovery and exposure in this manner is piecemeal and
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about reliability in an age of academia-industry integration. See Meir at 5. Congress, with enactment of the Food
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Model of Medical Privacy, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585631-32 (2009). However, successful establishment of
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The FDAMA presumption in favor of putting new drugs on the market conditioned with
follow-on clinical research, which the FDA has been lax in enforcing, 102 exacerbates this
reliance. 103 Also, clinical medical service (the delivery of care) remains heavily shielded from
regulatory intrusion—for example, assisted reproduction procedures which encompass novel
technology and use innovation but overall are deemed clinical service (the practice of medicine)
and escape regulation as experimentation. 104
The medical profession, and especially clinical researchers, embrace technology and
contribute to the concept of invisible death—the belief that death may be trumped through
science, as addressed above. 105 The medical profession’s mission is to treat and heal, so it is
understandable that “Some doctors may feel that the moment they break the bad news about a
terminal illness is the point at which they have nothing more to offer.” 106 As observed by Dr.
David Kuhl based upon more than fifteen years of end-of-life palliative care of patients, “One of
the most difficult times in the doctor-patient relationship is the moment when the doctor breaks
the news that the disease process will likely result in death. Both suffer, and each has his own
coping mechanisms.” 107 As illustrated by Joe’s experience, 108 general practitioners and clinical
extent to which release of negative clinical data is delayed and its overall integrity). Drug and device manufacturers
often interact with physicians in an ongoing manner, including through consulting and sponsored research
agreements that may create a sense of loyalty and even impose a silence obligation. See generally Meir, Don’t
Speak, supra note 85. Accordingly, these manufactures hold considerable influence, which is exacerbated in many
medical specialties:
For example, when Dr. Lawrence D. Dorr, an orthopedic specialist, warned fellow surgeons in an open
letter in 2008 that a hip implant made by Zimmer Holdings was flawed, he became the subject of a whisper
campaign that questioned his skills as a surgeon. “The first thing that a company does is to put out a
campaign that a surgeon does not know how to operate,” said Dr. Dorr, who was a consultant to Zimmer
when he wrote the letter. “It hurt my practice for a year.”
Id. at 5. Researchers who published data questioning Vioxx also experienced professional attacks, which reached
their employers. See Prescription Disaster, supra note 85.
102
See generally GAO FDA REPORT, supra note 89; IOM REPORT, supra note 89.
103
See Malinowski & Gautreaux, State of Puberty?, supra note 35, at 379-81 (addressing the codification of this
presumption under section 506B and the “fast track” provisions of FDAMA).
104
See generally Symposium, A Law-Policy Proposal to Know Where Babies Come from During the Reproductive
Revolution, 9 IOWA J. RACE & GENDER 549 (2006) (live and published symposium); Michael J. Malinowski,
Choosing the Genes of Children: Our Eugenics Past—Present and Future?, 36 CONN. L. REV. 125 (2003).
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See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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patients during the 1990s provides another vivid example of patients subjected to fates worse than death through
experimental treatments that actually accelerated the end of their lives:
The most noted recent example is the use of autologous bone marrow transplants in women with breast
cancer, an extraordinarily dangerous, painful, and costly treatment given to thousands of women in the
1990s. The study supporting the assumption of the efficacy of the treatment and relied on for more than a
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researches alike frequently disengage and shift interface with the patient to nurses and other
health care providers. 109 In such situations, general practitioners often are eager to refer patients
they cannot treat to clinical researchers and experimentation—thereby moving situations from
confrontation with death to treatment options, however unlikely to result in positive outcomes
and in spite of the risk of adverse events, considerably more pain and suffering, and the lost
opportunity for comfort and closure at the end of life. When these opportunities are presented,
many terminally ill patients are eager to exchange quality of life and endure even significantly
more pain and suffering and acceleration of life’s end for any opportunity to fend of death
through science. 110
U.S. medical education and medical practice center on science at a cost to the doctorpatient relationship:
What happens in a changing field of medicine, where we have to ask ourselves whether
medicine is to remain a humanitarian and respected profession or a new but
depersonalized science in the service of prolonging life rather than diminishing human
suffering? Where the medical students have a choice of dozens of lectures on RNA and
DNA but less experience in the simple doctor-patient relationship that used to be the
alphabet for every successful family physician? 111
Too often experimental treatments are embraced as a substitute for palliative care, meaning
comfort care at the end of life, rather than presented as an alternative with palliative care defined
and explained as a legitimate treatment option. 112 Palliative care, mistakenly, often is equated
with acceleration of the end of life by both physicians and patients. In fact, palliative care is
about focusing on the patient. To be specific, priority is placed on communication with the
patient and maximizing comfort—the avoidance of human suffering when possible, not
necessarily accelerating death. 113 There are ample instances where comfort care has extended
life beyond other treatment alternatives. 114 Often quality palliative care gives those who are
terminally ill an incentive to fight harder and to live longer, and to decline invasive treatment
bringing the patient to the brink of death through radically high doses of chemotherapy or radiation that wiped out
their bone marrow, and then reintroducing the bone marrow extracted earlier. See generally Kolata & Eichenwald,
supra; Cancer Study, supra. Given the depletion of their immunity systems, these patients often spent the end of
their lives in a state of isolation from family and friends and in excruciating pain, and by most accounts the end of
life was accelerated. See generally id. It is important to note, however, that advances in stem cell research
subsequent to the controversy in the 1990s has introduced reconsideration of the treatment. Cf. Owen C.B. Hughes,
Alan L. Jakimo, & Michael J. Malinowski, United States Regulation of Stem Cell Research: Recasting
Government’s Role and Questions to be Resolved, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101-161 (2009).
109
KUHL, WANT, supra note 106, at 38 (“People expect their doctors to be there for them through their illnesses, but
it doesn’t always happen. In fact, for some it’s the opposite.”).
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See generally Kathleen Tschantz Unroe & Dr. Diane E. Meier, Palliative Care and Hospice: Opportunities to
Improve Care for the Sickest Patients, 25 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. Pol’y 413 (2011). For general
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text.
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more likely to accelerate death than to postpone it. 115 Palliative care is not possible unless the
patient is humanized, and the individual patient and their comfort are the epicenter for treatment
decision making, albeit with the option of gambling with experimental treatments still available.

C. The Drug Developer’s Perspective
Drug developers are under crushing pressure to continue decades of high performance for
investors, 116 but the transition from traditional drug development to biotechnology-based R&D
with all of its specificity, complexity, and environmental influence is proving difficult, to say the
least. 117 “The average drug developed by a major pharmaceutical company costs at least $4
billion, and it can be as much as $11 billion.” 118 In spite of this enormous investment, 2007 was
the worse year in a quarter of a century for new drug approvals, and the following years have not
been much more fruitful. 119 Commercial drug development is struggling in a stage of puberty. 120
The situation is dire enough for the federal government to propose an intervention. 121 The crude
FDA standard for new drug approvals (shared among the top global pharmaceutical markets
through the International Conference on Harmonisation, ICH)—group design based upon
mathematical abstracts encompassing statistics, averages, and medians—is driving drug
developers to engage is voluminous human clinical trials in an effort to make medical sense out
of the human genome. 122 Over the last six years, the typical phase III trial has ballooned from
3,000 to 10,000 subjects at enormous expense. 123
Industry received what it bargained for through FDAMA, and the end result is a race to
the bottom for the major players. 124 Based upon drug development performance over the last
115
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quoting MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT DRUG COMPANIES, at xv (2004).
117
See generally Malinowski & Gautreaux, Drug Development, supra note 28; Malinowski & Gautreaux, All that is
Gold, supra note 30. Cf. G. Steven Burill, Polishing the Crystal Ball: G. Steven Burrill Predicts What's Ahead for
Biotech in 2009, BURRILL REP. (Jan. 2, 2009), http://www.burrillreport.com/article-980.html. The FDA approved eighteen
innovative new drugs in 2007, twenty-four in 2008, and twenty-six in 2009. Ed Silverman, How Many New Drugs Did
FDA Approve Last Year?, PHARMALOT (Feb. 18, 2011, 9:35 AM), http://www.pharmalot.com/2011/02/how-many-newdrugs-did-fda-approve-last-year; New Drug Approvals on Pace to Exceed 2008 Total, Res. Recap (June 9, 2009),
http://www.alacrastore.com/blog/index.php/2009/06/09/new-drug-approvals-on-pace-to-exceed-2008-total. But see Miho
Nagano, Big Pharma Looks for a Fix, INVESTOR'S BUS. DAILY, Sept. 29, 2008, at A9 (stating seventeen approvals in
2007).
118
Matthew Herper, The Truly Staggering Cost of Inventing New Drugs, FORBES MAG., Feb. 10, 2012, available at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2012/02/10/the-truly-staggering-cost-of-inventing-new-drugs/ (last
visited Apr. 11, 2013).
119
Jared A. Favole & Jennifer Corbett Dooren, FDA Approved More Drugs in 2008, WALL ST. J., Jan 2009, at A9;
Asher Mullard, 2010 FDA Drug Approvals, 10 NATURE REVS.: DRUG DISCOVERY 82, 84 tbl. 1 (2011) (listing
CDER’s 2010 approvals in chart form).
120
See generally Malinowski & Gautreaux, Drug Development, supra note 28; Malinowski & Gautreaux, All that is
Gold, supra note 30.
121
Gardiner Harris, A New Federal Research Center Will Help to Develop Medicines, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2011, at A1
(quoting Dr. Francis S. Collins, Director of the National Institutes of Health, in a story on the federal government's
decision to launch a billion-dollar drug development center to help industry create new pharmaceuticals).
122
See supra notes __ and accompanying text.
123
See supra notes 29 and 103 and accompanying text.
124
See generally supra note 99 and accompanying text. Cf. Herber, Cost, supra note 28.
116

21

decade in spite of the infusion of a universe of advancement in basic genetic science, myriad
enabling technologies, and enormous financial investment, the critics are right—the proof is in
the outcome: “[S]ome critics have taken issue with the amount of regulatory liberalization
already taken by the FDA since the late 1980s, suggesting that the FDA and the public have
misplaced their faith in science.” 125 The group design base science standard for FDA review—
efficacy approval based upon the mathematical abstracts of means, medians, averages, and
statistics, which actually may not reflect any individual who participated in the studies, followed
by at times carte blanch off label use by the medical profession—is antiquated and no reflection
of the technical specificity of biotechnology which centers on understanding disease pathways,
gene and environment interactions, and fundamentally why disease happens. 126
Treatment IND applications and Compassionate Uses allow the sponsors of potential new
drugs to recoup some manufacturing costs, and they may generate additional data that helps to
advance clinical trials. 127 However, increased access to experimental drugs has led to an
inability to separate the scope of recovery from the reality that almost all experimental drugs
never will prove effective, at least not effective enough to overcome safety concerns, and many
may prove extremely harmful. The failure rate of new drug candidates in clinical trials exceeds
ninety percent, and that is just against a science standard to beat a placebo based upon group
design and mathematical abstracts—be better than nothing, with a level of adverse events that is
deemed acceptable. 128 Even drugs that complete the FDA clinical trial process and are approved
for market use cause enormous harm to human health: Adverse drug reactions cause more than
100,000 deaths and more than two million hospitalizations annually in the United States-meaning that more people in the United States die from legal use of prescription medications
than from automobile accidents. 129 Basic science has been delivering—a map of the human
genome is in hand and basic science continues to explode with progress—so faith in science has
elevated legitimately, while drug development lingers and disappoints. Drawing potential
subjects away from clinical trials through alternative access to experimental treatments and
increasing pre-approval manufacturing pressures by added demands on supply will only
125
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complicate the drug development challenge. 130 Using experimental drugs outside of the controls
of clinical trials also increases the risk of adverse events, which require inquiry and may delay
market approval.
Drug developers need a jolt to snap into the realities of contemporary science and deliver
new drugs accordingly. In the meantime, the terminally ill in the U.S. with health care coverage
and their health care providers continue to scour all possibilities to postpone death. The
challenge is to intervene and to promote consideration of the quality of life and comfort over a
possibility of some added duration of life accompanied by the risk of accelerated death and grave
human suffering unless a fully informed patient opts for the latter after considering the former.

D. The Regulator’s (FDA’s) Perspective
FDAMA expanded the mission of the FDA to include efficiency along with efficacy and
safety, meaning to speed things up through more cooperation with drug sponsors. 131 There
lingers a misconception among many in the general public, scholars, government officials, and
industry representatives that the FDA imposes a paternalistic gold standard for new drug
approvals and market entry: “Historically, the American Public clamored for increased FDA
regulation of new drugs; however, more recent criticism has focused on how the FDA’s `gold
standard’ impedes consumer access to new, potentially lifesaving treatments.” 132 In fact, the
FDA science standard, based up group averages, medians, means and other mathematical
abstracts lingers as a remnant from the pharmaceutical past, with its focus on taking away
symptoms, rather than a reflection of the drug development present and future centered on the
specificity of human genetics and intervention in disease pathways. 133 The proof is in the
outcome: a troubling drop-off in new drug approvals in spite of an enormous increase of
financial investment in biopharmaceutical R&D and the infusion of myriad enabling
technologies, including a map of the human genome. 134 The FDA’s regulation of drugs it puts
130
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on the market also leaves much to be desired as exemplified by the recalls of drugs on pharmacy
shelves for years such as the COX-2 inhibitors Vioxx and Bexta, 135 and as concluded by both the
Institutes of Medicine (IOM) and Government Accountability Office in their 2006 assessments
of the FDA. 136 This poor performance inspired Congress to enact the sweeping FDAAA. 137
The issue of access for those terminally ill to experimental treatments is regulatory and
legislative at its core, not a judicial matter, as recognized by the Supreme Court in Rutherford, 138
by the D.C. Circuit in Abigail Alliance, and by the Supreme Court again in 2008 through its
denial of Abigail Alliance’s petition for certiorari. 139 Therefore, Congress, DHHS (through
OHRP), the FDA, and arguably CMS given the health care finance implications and
implementation of PPACA, must work through this matter, individually or collectively. 140 The
FDA clinical trial process, albeit open too wide with its better-than-nothing efficacy standard
coupled with a showing of tolerable safety, is at least a gate providing some quality control that
distinguishes approved and experimental treatments. 141 While adverse events caused by FDAapproved pharmaceuticals that have completed the clinical trial process raise serious concerns,
the greater than ninety-percent failure rate of experimental drugs demands extreme caution in
comingling them with patient care. 142 In addition to complicating compliance with the informed
consent requirements under the Common Rule and FDA regulations to protect human subjects,
processing compassionate use and treatment IND applications draws from the FDA’s
resources—especially when adverse events outside of clinical trials raise concerns that spill into
them.

IV.

A Law-Policy Proposal to Modify Human Subject Protection of the
Terminally Ill

“[B]irth, and lust, and illness, and death are changeless things, and when one of these harsh
facts springs out upon a man at some sudden turn of the path of life, it dashes off for the
moment his mask of civilization and gives a glimpse of the stranger and stronger face
below.”
135
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Sir Arthur Conan Doyle 143
Joe’s story illustrates the best and worst health care outcomes for the terminally ill who
access experimental treatments. 144 More than fourteen years of productive life shifted into nine
months of enduring what Joe himself ultimately referred to as a fate worse than death during his
final days. Belief in science and medicine runs deep in U.S. culture, 145 but the reality of drug
development is a greater than ninety-percent failure rate of new drug candidates, 146 and only onethird of medications that satisfy the FDA safety and efficacy standards perform as anticipated
when prescribed to patients. 147 According to the Institute of Medicine, there are approximately
two million serious adverse drug reactions each year that require hospitalization and cause
100,000 deaths—more than from work-place and motor vehicle accidents. 148
This time of sweeping federal and state health care reforms through PPACA
implementation, reconsideration of the Common Rule, and expansive, ongoing clinical research
presents an opportunity to improve health care decision making at the end of life fundamentally
and substantially. The following discussion proposes law and policy reforms to heighten
protection of the terminally ill who seek experimental treatments without unduly impeding
clinical research and responsible access to experimental treatments.

A. Classification of the Terminally Ill as a “Vulnerable Group”
The terminally ill should be directly and fully recognized as a “vulnerable group” under
the Common Rule and FDA regulations in a manner on par with pregnant women, fetuses,
children, prisoners, and those who are cognitively impaired; review and oversight of research on
them should be subjected to stricter scrutiny; and more protections tailored to the specific
vulnerabilities of the terminally ill should be introduced. 149 The protections should be especially
strong and encompass multiple sets of vulnerable group considerations where patients are both
terminally ill and a member another recognized protected group—for example, terminally ill
children. As explained by Professor George Annas, “Incapacitated and hospitalized because of
illness, frightened by strange and impersonal routines, and fearful for his health and perhaps life,
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[the patient] is far from exercising a free power of choice when the person to whom he anchors
all his hopes asks [him to help] . . . carry out some very important research . . . .” 150 The
Department of Health and Human Services acknowledged the particular human subject
vulnerabilities of those who are terminally ill in a 1993 guidance, but the same guidance also
supports expanded access outside of controlled trials, and it has not been formalized into
regulations or even updated in two decades. 151 Although the Alliance and its supporters continue
to propose reductions of regulatory standards to increase access to experimental treatments for
those who are terminally ill, 152 heightened protection of research subjects and access to
experimental treatments are not mutually exclusive. For instance, relative to clinical research
overall, more biomedical research on pregnant women and children takes place today than any
time in the past. 153 As recognized in Rutherford, “the concept of safety . . . is not without
meaning for terminal patients. For the terminally ill, as for anyone else, a drug is unsafe if its
potential for inflicting death or physical injury is not offset by the possibility of therapeutic
benefit.” 154
During the informed consent process with those who are terminally ill, human subject
protection regulations should mandate the presentation of palliative care inside and outside of
hospice care as a treatment option in a manner comparable with the experimental treatment
option. 155 In addition to the quality of life and other benefits of palliative care, 156 there is
evidence that palliative care prolongs life: 157
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In contrast to many assumptions that palliative care and hospice care may hasten death,
recent studies have demonstrated that palliative care and hospice may be associated with
prolongation of life. An analysis of nearly 4,500 Medicare patients with heart failure or
cancer found that survival of patients who received some hospice services was nearly a
month longer than patients who did not receive hospice. A recent study randomized
patients with advanced lung cancer to receive palliative care along with standard
oncology care as compared with patients receiving only standard oncology care.
Although the patients receiving palliative care along with best cancer care were less
likely to receive aggressive care, they had an improved survival benefit of 2.7 months
compared to the best cancer care only control group.
Despite the association between hospice and giving up on treatment for the terminal illness, a
precondition to qualify for the Medicare Hospice benefit, 158 there has been a surge in use of
hospice services during the last decade: approximately forty percent of all deaths in the U.S. in
2009 (1.56 million patients) involved use of hospice services. 159 Unfortunately, these hospice
stays are brief (the median duration of stay is just twenty to twenty-one days), 160 which
“reduce[s] the opportunity for patients and their families to receive the full benefit of hospice
services and also limit[s] the ability of hospice care to have a positive impact upon the use of
other health care resources, i.e., reducing avoidable hospitalizations and other intensive services
or procedures near the end of life.” 161
The presentation of palliative care as a treatment option in research and a mandatory
component of the informed consent process would require that the institutional review boards
(IRBs) overseeing research on the terminally ill include members with substantial palliative care
professional expertise and experience. 162 The American Board of Internal Medicine has
recognized palliative medicine as a subspecialty since 2006, and the American Board of Nursing
Specialties has accredited a master’s-level hospice and palliative care certification program since
2007. 163 The first physician palliative subspecialty exam was administered in 2008 and, as of
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2011, there were approximately seventy certified post-graduate fellowship-training programs in
palliative medicine—which supports the feasibility of this proposal. 164 However, in spite of the
inevitability of death and pervasiveness of terminal illness within the scope of delivery of care,
palliative care training has not become a staple in medical education or residency programs: 165
While the increasing availability of clinical palliative care programs represents forward
progress in the field, workforce development lags behind. Multiple national reports have
called attention to this issue. The 2001 Institute of Medicine (IOM) report Improving
Palliative Care for Cancer states that “[m]ost new physicians leave medical school and
residency program with little training or experience in caring for dying patients. It
reports that appropriately trained nurses and social workers are also in short supply. The
IOM report makes the following recommendations to improve training in medicine,
nursing, and social work: (1) faculty development; (2) education materials and
curriculum development; (3) coordination among training programs for the variety of
professionals involved in the care of dying patients; (4) guidelines for residency programs
and increased palliative and end-of-life content in licensing and certifying examinations;
and (5) improving the research base for palliative care education.
Standard of care, professional liability, and market forces—especially in an age of increased
privatization of and commercialization of hospitalization and delivery of care—suggest that
recognizing and utilizing palliative care professionals under the Common Rule and through
PPACA implementation as proposed below 166 should enhance demand for palliative care
expertise, increase overall recognition of the field, and improve the relevant professional
education and training.
The informed consent process should be rigorous enough to convey the risk that access to
an experimental treatments will mask the real possibility of death and sacrifice an opportunity to
make “invisible death” visible—meaning to accept death and, relative to the alternative, to find
considerable comfort in the final phase of life. 167 “For some people, learning that they have a
terminal illness is a gift of time to pay close attention to who they really are, discover the sense
of a high power, and grow in self-acceptance and love. As this spiritual discovery unfolds, the
fear of death is diminished or even eliminated.” 168 As observed by Elisabeth Kubler-Ross in On
Death and Dying, a compilation of insights culled from decades of personal experience working
with the terminally ill: 169
If a patient is allowed to terminate his life in the familiar and beloved environment, it
requires less adjustment for him. His own family knows him well enough to replace a
sedative with a glass of his favorite wine; or the smell of a home-cooked soup may give
him the appetite to sip a few spoons of fluid which, I think, is still more enjoyable than an
164
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infusion. I will not minimize the need for sedatives and infusions and realize full-well
from my own experience as a country doctor that they are sometimes life-saving and
often unavoidable. But I also know that patience and familiar people and foods could
replace many a bottle of intravenous fluids given for the simple reason that it fulfills the
physiological need without involving too many people and/or individual nursing care.
As a prerequisite for consideration, IRBs reviewing research proposals that expose the
terminally ill to experimental treatments should require investigators and research sponsors to
establish clear criteria necessitating removal of subjects from the studies and encouragement to
transition into palliative care treatments with options to do so fully identified and accompanied
by administrative support to make such transitions both doable and as non-stressful as possible
under the circumstances. They also should mandate provisions to maximize ongoing IRB
oversight with periodic reassessment of the subjects’ conditions accompanied by disclosure to
them and renewed consultation about the palliative care alternative options. Moreover, the
investigators and sponsors of such studies should be required to establish with specificity an
obligation to cover the costs of palliative care treatments not otherwise reimbursed by the
subjects’ health insurances—or to make such coverage a prerequisite for study participation—for
those who withdraw from or who are otherwise removed from these studies at any time. Study
sponsors should be required to put the resources needed to meet this obligation in trust prior to
commencement of the studies.
Discussion of end-of-life scenarios should be accompanied by execution of legal
instruments recognized in the relevant jurisdictions that formalize final wishes, ensure the
individual’s control over the end of their life, avoid judicial intervention under the doctrine of
substituted judgment, 170 and spare family members and close friends from speculation and the
stress of life-and-death decision making for loved ones. 171 Living wills, directives, and proxies
now are being shored up by adding medical orders signed by a doctor, known as Physician
Orders for Life Sustaining Treatment (POLST), which are entered in the medical record. 172
“With these physician orders, the doctor, or in some states a nurse practitioner or physician
assistant, leads conversations with patients, family members and surrogates to determine whether
a patient with advanced illness wants aggressive life-sustaining treatment, a limited intervention
or simply palliative or hospice care.” 173 Such deliberation with a health care provider committed
to delivery of care, directly serving the patient, and removed from a vested (conflict of) interest
in the research protocol and research outcome would provide a meaningful added caution for one
who is terminally ill and considering an experimental treatment.
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B. Additional Conditions for Compassionate Use and Treatment IND
Applications
The Abigail Alliance litigation and the organization’s ongoing lobbying have inspired
multiple legislative proposals to exempt the terminally ill from full FDA drug review and
approval protections through expansion of Compassionate Use and Treatment IND venues for
access to experimental treatments. 174 The underlying rationale, articulated through the Abigail
Alliance litigation, is that those who are terminally ill and without health care options other than
experimental treatments are, with support from their physicians, entitled to access them—at least
to the extent that FDA standards for safety and efficacy as preconditions for general market
access should not be imposed on them and impede a patient-doctor choice to assume risks for the
only opportunity to save one’s life. 175
The protection of individuals who are terminally ill and seek access to experimental
treatments outside of the clinical research context should be heightened, not lessened.
Experimental treatments under study are a transition from health care potential to health care
reality, far from the equivalent of health care reality given the greater than ninety-percent failure
rate of new drug candidates. 176 Patients receiving them share the vulnerability of research
subjects, and more risk is introduced when research self-awareness is pushed to the side of
patient and treatment norms. DHHS recognized as much over three decades ago: 177
Informed consent is especially important in Treatment IND situations because the
subjects are desperately ill and particularly vulnerable. They will be receiving
medications, which have not been proven either safe or effective, in a clinical setting.
Both the setting and the recipients’ desperation may work against their ability to make an
informed assessment of the risk involved. IRBs must ensure that potential subjects are
fully aware of the risks involved in participation.
In addition, although experimental treatments delivered through the Compassionate Use
and Treatment IND mechanisms may contribute to the progress of the clinical trials they are
drawn from, delivery of care is the primary focus and social justification. 178 These treatment
uses draw from clinical research, but they offer no comparable counterpart to the primary social
justification for exposing human subjects to risks in clinical trials—the advancement of human
health science, furthering the transition from health care potential to health care reality, and the
improvement of human health. 179 In fact, Treatment INDs may impede their clinical trial
counterparts by drawing potential subjects away from them. “As one scientist put it, ‘Why
would patients who are sophisticated, demanding, and willing to participate in experiments take
a chance on receiving a placebo when they want the active compound?’" 180
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The FDA standard for market approval is too low: Out preform nothing (a placebo) with
tolerable levels of risk based upon mathematical abstracts—group means and averages which
may not reflect reality for any individual actually in the study—coupled with broad physician
discretion to use approved drugs off label. 181 Nevertheless, en masse market use of FDAapproved drugs contrasts with Compassionate Uses isolated to individuals and with Treatment
INDs limited to small groups. 182 The check on efficacy and safety provided by physician-patient
experience through market use, relied upon heavily (arguably too heavily 183) with FDAapproved pharmaceuticals and recognized in the provisions of FDAAA to establish the Sentinel
reporting system, 184 is removed when experimental treatments are delivered as health care prior
to market approval and general population use.
Standing law and policy extends safety and human subject protections inside the context
of clinical trials under FDA supervision to health care delivery applications of the experimental
treatments under Compassionate Uses and Treatment INDs. The sponsor and investigators must
comply with all applicable provisions governing INDs, including distribution of the drug through
qualified experts, maintenance of manufacturing facilities with sufficient quality assurance, and
submission of IND safety reports. 185 Compassionate Use approvals are case-by-case add-ons to
ongoing clinical research, which the FDA typically conditions on adherence to the human subject
protections implemented in the clinical research trials they are drawn from. 186 Treatment INDs
must be reviewed by an IRB prior to submission to the FDA, and they must comply with the
regulations governing IRBs 187 and informed consent. 188 The responsibility of IRBs remains
consistent: prohibit unreasonable and unnecessary risks, monitor the sufficiency of informed
consent forms and processes, and oversee progress. 189
Accordingly, contrary to the Alliance’s position, recognition of the terminally ill as a
“vulnerable group” and associated reforms must be applied to experimental treatments beyond
the scope of clinical trials. 190 In fact, IRB scrutiny should be enhanced to account for the added
risks of deviating from the express research context. For example, in addition to the added risks
discussed above, the option of recouping the costs of manufacturing drugs for experimental uses
outside of clinical trials may tempt sponsors to market them aggressively to the terminally ill to
subsidize the cost of manufacturing supply for clinical trial use and to generate additional data
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without the cost of manufacturing and under their discretion to submit for FDA consideration
depending on data outcomes. 191

C. End-of-Life Decision Making Under PPACA
PPACA is a sweeping legislative response to the unsustainable escalation of health care
costs. 192 A major impetus for the legislation was a 2007 Congressional Budget Office report that
documented the problem with numbers even bleaker than most anticipated and a firm, resonating
conclusion that the escalation of health care finance costs in the U.S. is unsustainable. 193 The
health care reform mandated by PPACA presents an opportunity to substantially improve end-oflife decision making. Realizing the fundamental factors that drove enactment of PPACA, 194 the
need to contain health care costs and improve access to and the quality of health care, requires
nothing less.
PPACA contained a provision that encouraged consultations with Medicare patients to
discuss treatment options at the end of life including palliative care, but it was denounced as a
“death panel provision” and left out of the final bill. 195 However, PPACA as enacted contains
other provisions which are a means to promote palliative care through research and
reimbursement. In fact, PPACA mandated the federal government to publish quality measures
for hospice. 196 A Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute (PCORI) and a Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation have been established, and formation of an Independent
Payment Advisory Board (IPAB) is underway. 197 Each of these mechanisms is intended to
improve health care decision making and to reduce escalation of health care costs—objectives
that necessitate responsiveness to palliative care. 198
Responsiveness to palliative care in PPACA implementation will demand its inclusion in
medical school curricula and improve the supply of sorely needed palliative care expertise in
reasonable time. Changing physician and patient culture to alter end-of-life decision making
systemically is a much more challenging matter—as exemplified by the aggressive challenges to
IPAB, including one from the American Medical Association. 199 Care-at-all-costs health care
norms are deeply embedded. When there is insurance coverage, physicians and patients are
191
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reactionary to imminent death and reach broadly for intervention. 200 Nevertheless, the social
needs that drove passage of PPACA and implementation of the resulting legislation demand the
change: “If purchasing affordable basic insurance or paying taxes to support a society-wide
insurance pool is a citizen’s obligation, then delivering insurance and care efficiently and with a
cost-worthy scope is a concomitant obligation of insurers and providers.” 201 Joe’s care during
the last ten months of his life, especially the aggressive experimental surgeries, was beyond
wasteful—as Joe came to appreciate during his final weeks of his life. Unfortunately, where
there is access to care, Joe’s story is far too common, and the stories accumulate in terms of both
good health care decision making and cost. 202 When per year of life (YOL) actuarial
calculations are introduced (life extension comparisons where there are aggressive added health
care interventions at the end of life with scenarios where there are not), 203 the waste in our health
care system attributable to end-of-life decision making is undeniable and extraordinary: 204
D. Global Implementation
The endeavor of biopharmaceutical research and development (R&D) crosses borders,
markets, and governments. Clinical research, the setting for experimental treatments, has
globalized through escalating reliance on contract research organizations (CROs) and the shear
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increase in volume of clinical research—both in the number and scope of clinical trials. 205 Over
the last two decades, the world’s three largest pharmaceutical markets—those of the U.S.,
Europe, and Japan—have integrated officially to create shared science standards and to avoid
research duplication through the International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical
Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH), which embodies
government and industry representation from these markets. 206
U.S. regulatory reforms to better protect the terminally ill contemplating experimental
treatments should be incorporated into the ICH standards for good clinical practice. In fact, the
U.S. would benefit from this integration and application given that Europe and Japan are much
more receptive to and experienced in palliative care and the realities of health care resource
rationing that inspired enactment of PPACA and are at the core of its implementation.

V.

Conclusion

“[T]he idea of death, the fear of it, haunts the human animal like nothing else; it is a
mainspring of human activity—activity designed largely to avoid the fatality of death, to
overcome it by denying in some way that it is the final destiny for man.”
Ernest Becker 207
Joe’s story relays the best and worst scenarios when clinical research and clinical care are
comingled. Experimental care is just that—experimental, meaning the possibility of a transition
from health care potential to health care reality. 208 The over-arching message of this article is
that the terminally ill are vulnerable and should be recognized and protected as such during this
possible transition.
Two misconceptions drive end-of-life care in the U.S., and law and policy governing
experimental treatments for the terminally ill must be modified to address them for the sake of
protecting human subjects. First, palliative care is not intentional acceleration of the end of life,
or even dismissal of the hope of continuation of life. 209 Rather, it is acceptance of the limits of
and consequences of continued aggressive health care intervention inconsistent with the priority
of patient comfort and recognition of the practical limits of health care. 210 With priority on
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patient comfort, palliative care also often extends the duration of life deemed terminal. 211
Second, while health care capabilities have expanded enormously, human clinical trials have
multiplied exponentially, and the potential for treatment applications churned from the research
underway is simply breathtaking. Unfortunately, as self-evident in the greater than ninetypercent failure rate of new drug candidates, 212 potential is not reality in the vast majority of
terminal cases. Moreover, that potential is accompanied by the realities of accelerated death and
imposition of additional suffering in many cases, and the too often realized danger of doing harm
within the scope of research. The “DNA mystique” 213 is intoxicating for all involved—
especially for the terminally ill who must confront the reality of death.
Acceptance of mortality is a struggle for patients and the health providers caring for
them. The tendency to deny death must be checked during the process of end-of-life decision
making. Human subject protections are recognition that the gate to access experimental
treatments must be closed enough to prevent medical interventions that impose excessive harm,
albeit with the intention to help and responsiveness to the compelling want of hope. Joe’s story
is just one of many thousands in a given year. There are fates worse than death, even with the
best of intentions to reach into imminent death with science to create additional life. Doctor
Frankenstein has no place in contemporary health care in spite of the seduction of genomic
science. 214
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APPENDIX I. 215
Research Spending Per New Drug
Total R&D
Number of
R&D Spending Spending 1997Company
Ticker drugs approved Per Drug ($Mil) 2011 ($Mil)
AstraZeneca
AZN
5
11,790.93
58,955
GlaxoSmithKline GSK
10
8,170.81
81,708
Sanofi
SNY
8
7,909.26
63,274
Roche Holding AG RHHBY
11
7,803.77
85,841
Pfizer Inc.
PFE
14
7,727.03
108,178
Johnson & Johnson JNJ
15
5,885.65
88,285
Eli Lilly & Co.
LLY
11
4,577.04
50,347
Abbott Laboratories ABT
8
4,496.21
35,970
Merck & Co Inc
MRK
16
4,209.99
67,360
Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co.
BMY
11
4,152.26
45,675
Novartis AG
NVS
21
3,983.13
83,646
Amgen Inc.
AMGN
9
3,692.14
33,229
Sources: InnoThink Center For Research In Biomedical Innovation; Thomson Reuters
Fundamentals via FactSet Research Systems

215

Herper, Staggering Cos, supra note 101.

36

APPENDIX II. 216

Research Spending Per New Drug
R&D spending 1997-2011
Company Number of drugs approved per drug ($BIL)* total ($BIL)*
5
$11.80
$59.00
AstraZeneca
10
8.2
81.7
GlaxoSmithKline
8
7.9
63.3
Sanofi
11
7.8
85.8
Roche Holding
14
7.7
108.2
Pfizer
11
4.6
50.3
Eli Lilly & Co
16
4.2
67.4
Merck & Co
21
4
83.6
Novartis
*All figures are adjusted for inflation. Sources: InnoThink Center For Research
In Biomedical Innovation; Thomson Reuters Fundamentals via FactSet Research Systems.
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